Numbers, not value, motivate cooperation in humans and orangutans by Ellen E. Furlong & John E. Opfer
1 
 
 
 
Numbers, not value, motivate cooperation in humans 
and orangutans 
Ellen E. Furlong and John E. Opfer 
Department of Psychology, The Ohio State University, 1835 Neil Avenue, Columbus, 
OH 43210, USA 
 
 
 
 
N
at
ur
e 
Pr
ec
ed
in
gs
 : 
hd
l:1
01
01
/n
pr
e.
20
07
.1
39
2.
1 
: P
os
te
d 
5 
De
c 
20
07
2 
Cooperation among competitors—whether sharing the burden of wind resistance 
in the Tour de France, forming price-fixing cartels in economic markets, or 
adhering to arms-control agreements in international treaties—seldom spreads in 
proportion to the potential benefits1. To gain insight into the minds of 
uncooperative agents, economists and social psychologists have used the prisoner’s 
dilemma task2-6 to examine factors leading to cooperation among competitors. Two 
types of factors have emerged in these studies: the relative rewards of defecting 
versus cooperating7,8 and breakdowns in trust, forgiveness and communication6,9. 
The generalizability of economic and social psychological factors, however, relies 
on the assumption that agents’ comparisons of gains and losses (whether for 
themselves, others, or both) preserves ratio information over arbitrary units, such 
as dollars and cents, and real rewards, such as food. This assumption is 
inconsistent with psychophysical studies on how the brain represents quantitative 
information, which suggests that mental magnitudes increase logarithmically with 
actual value10-11. Thus, discrimination of two numerical magnitudes improves as 
the numerical distance between them increases12-14 and decreases as the 
magnitudes increase13-15. Here we show an important consequence of this 
representational system for economic decision making: in the prisoner’s dilemma 
game, purely nominal increases in the numerical magnitude of payoffs (such as, 
converting dollar values to cents or whole grapes into grape-parts) has a large 
effect on cooperative behaviour. Moreover, a logarithmic scaling of the ratio of 
rewards for cooperation versus defection predicted 97% of variability in observed 
cooperation, whereas the objective ratio predicted 0% of variability. By linking the 
brain’s system of representing the magnitude of rewards to motivations for 
cooperative behaviour, these findings suggest that the nature of numerical 
representations may also account for the subjective value function described by 
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Bernoulli24, in which the apparent value of monetary incentives increases 
logarithmically with actual value. 
To examine the effect of quantitative representations on cooperative behaviour, 
we manipulated nominal rewards for cooperation and observed human and nonhuman 
(orangutan) performance in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma game. The prisoner’s 
dilemma is defined by the payoffs two players can earn by either cooperating with their 
partner or defecting; specifically, the temptation for defecting when one’s partner has 
cooperated (T, e.g. $5) is a greater payoff than the reward for mutual cooperation (R; 
$3), which in turn is greater than the punishment for mutual defection (P; $1), which is 
greater than the ‘sucker’s reward’ (S; $0), when one has cooperated and one’s partner 
has defected (Supplementary Figure 1).  This payoff structure creates the dilemma; each 
individual does best on any given iteration to make the competitive move, however, 
overall both parties earn most if they make cooperative moves.  
Assuming the prisoner’s dilemma game is iterated and that one’s partner is 
playing a reciprocal strategy, computer simulations show that players optimally 
maximize rewards by cooperating on all trials2; in reality, subjects cooperate 
considerably less often25.  Game theory predicts that cooperation would be avoided 
when the temptation to defect (T) is greater than the reward for mutual cooperation (R)4; 
in other words, when the ratio R/T is less than 1. However, since this computation is 
made by a living brain that, unlike computer simulations, scales numbers 
logarithmically10,11, we predicted that cooperation would be a function of ln(R)/ln(T).  
These two functions—the linear R/T model and the logarithmic ln(R)/ln(T)—
allowed us to generate novel predictions regarding the effects of manipulating payoffs 
on cooperative behaviour. The linear model would predict no change in cooperation 
behaviour given a purely nominal change from dollars to cents (3/5 = 300/500 = 0.6), 
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whereas the logarithmic model would predict more cooperation with payoffs framed in 
terms of cents than in terms of dollars [ln(3)/ln(5) = .68; ln(300)/ln(500) = .92].  
In Experiment 1 we conducted an iterated prisoner’s dilemma task with 
undergraduate students in which half of the pairs were presented with payoffs in the 
form of dollars (R=$3; S=$0; T=$5; P=$1) and the other half with an equivalent amount 
of money presented in terms of cents (R=300¢; S=0¢; T=500¢; P=100¢).  Contrary to 
the assumption made by traditional economic theory (the linear model), rates of 
individual cooperation, mutual cooperation, mutual defection and “forgiveness” were 
not equivalent in the two conditions (Figure 1).  Rather, as predicted by the logarithmic 
model, cooperative behaviour (individual and mutual cooperation rates) was more 
frequent when payoffs were framed in terms of cents, whereas competitive behaviour 
(mutual defection) was more frequent when payoffs were framed in terms of dollars. 
Additionally, subjects were quicker to “forgive” their partner—that is, to cooperate after 
their partner’s first defection— in the cents condition than in the dollars condition.   
Numeric comparisons made in the prisoner’s dilemma task were next examined 
outside the task to ensure the magnitude effect held for the numbers in the payoff 
matrices (e.g. $1 vs $5 or 100¢ vs 500¢). Consistent with our assumption, subjects (n 
=22) more quickly compared smaller numbers (e.g. 3 vs 5) than larger numbers (e.g. 
300 vs 500; t[44] = 1.94, p = .03). This difference cannot be explained by a 
speed/accuracy tradeoff, as subjects were equally accurate in the small number 
condition as in the large number condition (t[44] = 1.82, p > .05).  
To ensure these condition differences were not due to subjects’ simply devaluing 
pennies, the units (pennies) in Experiment 3 remained constant, and we either increased 
the payoffs by adding a constant to all matrix values (e.g. adding 100 or 1000) or 
decreased the payoffs by multiplying all payoffs by a constant (e.g. 0.01 or 0.001).  
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According to the linear model, multiplying by a constant should not change cooperation 
rates in relation to the baseline matrix (the “1” matrix), whereas adding a constant 
should lead to an increase in cooperation.  However, according to the logarithmic 
hypothesis, adding or multiplying by a constant should lead to an increase in 
cooperation in relation to the baseline (Table 1). 
We tested the logarithmic model by regressing R/T and ln(R)/ln(T) against 
cooperation rates of subjects playing iterated prisoner’s dilemma games. While the 
linear model accounted for none of the variance in cooperation rates (R2 = 0), our 
logarithmic model of cooperation accounted for virtually all of the variance (R2 = .97, 
Figure 2). As a manipulation check, subjects were again asked to make relative size 
discriminations of the values in the payoff matrices used in Experiment 3. Subjects (n = 
92) took longer to respond to very small numbers (0.003 vs 0.005) and very large 
numbers (1003 vs 1005) than to single digit integers (3 vs 5) (N = 96; F[4, 464] = 19.12, 
p < .001). Again, this difference cannot be explained by a speed/accuracy tradeoff, as 
subjects were not only faster, but more accurate in the “1” condition than the other 
conditions (F[4, 464] = 3.57, p = .0007).  
Subjective number accounted for more variation in economic cooperation than 
objective number (Experiment 3) or subjective value (Experiment 1), suggesting that 
cognitive constraints on cooperation were more powerful than economic ones. To 
examine the influence of social variables on economic cooperation, we next compared 
performance of humans to that of a non-social primate—the orangutan (Pongo 
pygmaeus).  Orangutans, like all primates, show both magnitude and distance effects26.  
However, unlike most other primates, orangutans are solitary; the only common social 
pairs lasting more than a few hours among wild orangutans are mothers with their 
offspring27.  Additionally, orangutans generally perform poorly on social cognitive 
tasks, including imitation and theory of mind28. If cooperation depends largely on social 
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skills, nonsocial animals such as the orangutan should not cooperate on a prisoner’s 
dilemma task29. However, if cooperation depends on representation of magnitude, 
orangutans should show similar patterns of cooperation to humans.  
In Experiment 4 we conducted a prisoner’s dilemma task with one female 
orangutan, Bella. In one condition she earned payoffs of whole grapes (R=3; S=0; T=5; 
P=1), analogous to our dollars condition in Experiment 1, and in a second condition she 
earned pieces of grapes such that 1 grape was cut into 10 pieces (R=30; S=0; T=50; 
P=10), analogous to the cents condition in Experiment 1.  Contrary to the predictions of 
a social cognitive model, a similar pattern of results was found as with humans: on the 
first day of testing in the respective conditions she cooperated on 67% of the trials in the 
cut up grapes condition, and she never cooperated in the whole grapes condition. Like 
humans, she exhibited more cooperative behaviour (individual and mutual cooperation) 
in the grape pieces condition, and more competitive behaviour (mutual defection) in the 
whole grapes condition (Figure 3). Additionally, she was much quicker to forgive in the 
grape pieces condition than in the whole grapes condition.  
As a manipulation check similar to Experiment 2, in Experiment 5 we conducted a 
number discrimination task with Bella and three additional orangutans.  We found that 
the orangutans were quicker to make accurate small number discriminations (M = 1.48 
seconds; SD = .51) than accurate large number discriminations (M = 2.23 seconds; SD = 
1.4; Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test; Z = 3.36, p < .001; due to the small sample size, a 
nonparametric test was used).  Similarly, we conducted a preference task with Bella to 
determine whether the condition differences in cooperation could be due to preference 
for whole grapes as opposed to grape pieces.  However, she selected grape pieces over 
an equivalent amount of whole grapes exactly 50% of the time. Thus, condition 
differences in cooperation were better predicted by numeric discrimination than by 
preferences for whole or cut up grapes.   
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We have shown that both social and non-social animals alike rely on 
logarithmically scaled subjective quantities when making economic decisions, 
suggesting that representation of number may account for variation in cooperation 
behaviour over and above both economic and social motives. These findings shed much 
light on the widely used subjective value function, famously depicted by Daniel 
Bernoulli’s observation that “A gain of one thousand ducats is more significant to a 
pauper than to a rich man though both gain the same amount”24. Although this function 
has been interpreted to suggest that differences among large rewards are less valuable 
than differences in small rewards, the function incorrectly predicted that value changes 
would be critical and unit changes merely nominal30. Rather, it appears that nominal 
numeric changes in economic rewards have surprisingly robust effects on incentivizing 
economic cooperation, suggesting that subjective value may rely on how the brain 
represents numerical magnitude. 
Methods Summary 
In Experiment 1, two undergraduates played a prisoner’s dilemma game to earn pretend 
money. One was instructed to play the Tit-for-Tat strategy, whereas the second received 
no instructions on strategy use. Payoffs varied between subjects, such that half played 
for dollars (R=$3; S=$0; T=$5; P=$1) and half for an equivalent amount of pennies 
(R=300¢; S=0¢; T=500¢; P=100¢). Experiment 2 presented subjects with a 
computerized reaction time task in which they were asked to quickly and accurately 
determine the larger of two numbers.  
Procedures for Experiment 3 were identical to those of Experiments 1 and 2, 
except the baseline matrix (R=3¢; S=0¢; T=5¢; P=1¢) had either a constant amount 
added (+100, +1000) or multiplied (X0.001 or X0.01 resulting in five between-subjects 
conditions (Table 1).   
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Four orangutans from the Louisville Zoological Gardens participated in 
Experiments 4 and 5. Whereas humans played the prisoner’s dilemma for dollars or 
cents, orangutans played for whole grapes or pieces, where one grape was cut into 10 
pieces (whole grapes: R=3; S=0; T=5; P=1; grape pieces: R=30; S=0; T=50; P=10). The 
animals pursued an initial mutualism task with methodologies identical to the prisoner’s 
dilemma except for changes to the payoff matrix intended to highlight the benefits of 
cooperation (whole grapes: R=5; S=1; T=6; P=3; grape pieces: R=50; S=10; T=60; 
P=30). Before beginning the prisoner’s dilemma, orangutans were required to cooperate 
at 75% on two consecutive days with a human experimenter playing Tit-for-Tat. Only 
one orangutan (Bella) succeeded; thus, she participated in both conditions (first the 
grape pieces, then the whole grapes), but was required to reach criterion on the 
mutualism task a second time between conditions. In Experiment 5 orangutans selected 
which of two quantities of grapes they wanted; solution times were later coded from 
videos.  Because of the small sample size in this experiment, nonparametric statistical 
analyses were used.  
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The predictions made by the models for the 5 matrices in Experiment 3. 
Condition Linear Model:   
R/T 
Logarithmic Model: 
ln(R)/ln(T 
“1”: R = 3; S = 0; T = 5; P = 1 0.6 0.68 
“0.001”: R =0.003; S =0; T =0.005; P =0.001 0.6 1.10 
“0.01”: R =0.03; S =0; T =0.05; P =0.01 0.6 1.17 
“101”: R =103; S =100; T =105; P =101 0.98 1.0 
“1001”: R = 1003; S=1000; T =1005; P =1001 0.99 1.0 
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Figure 1:   
Results for Experiment 1.  Subjects in the cents condition (N = 16) exhibited 
more cooperative behaviour as measured by individual (t[29] = 2.79, p = .01) 
and mutual cooperation rates (t[29] = 2.6, p = .02), and less competitive 
behaviour, as measured by mutual defection (t[29] = 3.01, p = .01), than 
subjects in the dollars condition (N = 16).  Additionally, subjects in the cents 
condition were quicker to “forgive” their partner—to cooperate after their 
partner’s first defection—than subjects in the dollars condition (t[29] = 1.77, p = 
.04).   
Figure 2:   
Results for Experiment 3.  The logarithmic model, ln(R)/ln(T) accounted for 
virtually all of the variance in cooperation rates observed in Experiment 3 (R2 = 
0.97), whereas the linear model (R/T) accounted for none (R2 = 0). 
Figure 3: 
Results for Experiment 4.  As predicted, the orangutan showed similar patterns 
of cooperation as humans, exhibiting more individual and mutual cooperation 
rates, as well as less mutual defection in the cut up grapes condition as 
compared to the whole grapes condition. Additionally, she was quicker to 
forgive her partner in the cut up grapes condition than in the whole grapes 
condition. 
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